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Abstract 
Amidst the growing incidence of urban crime in Ghana is the proliferation of private security companies (PSCs). 
As of December 2014, Ghana’s Ministry of Interior, responsible for the registration and regulation of PSCs, reported 
that there were as many as 176 licensed companies in ‘good standing’ (that is, companies which have renewed their 
operating licenses) in the country. In broad terms, the proliferation of PSCs reflects a global trend and represents a 
logical extension of economic liberalization and privatization efforts of the Ghanaian state. The broad proposition 
in the security literature is that as the state cuts back on public services such as policing and security, the popular 
doctrine of resilience shifts the burden of security to society and consequently justifying the use of private security 
organizations. While PSCs have proliferated in recent decades, little studies have been done regarding their conform‑
ity with the existing policy, institutional and legal framework that set them up and the public perceptions about their 
activities and crime prevention in Ghanaian cities. More importantly, the extent to which PSCs have impacted on 
crime incidence and the public’s perceptions on their operations and accessibility remain to be explored. Based on 
key informant interviews as well as a survey of 2745 households undertaken in key Ghanaian cities (Accra, Kumasi, 
Sekondi‑Takoradi and Tamale), this study seeks to bridge these knowledge gaps by critically examining households’ 
perceptions of PSCs and crime in large Ghanaian metropolitan cities. Quite contrary to the dominant propositions in 
the literature, the household survey identifies job creation/business as the single most important driver for the prolif‑
eration of PSCs.
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Background
Although there are many dimensions of urban crime, stud-
ies have indicated its widespread existence in all countries 
(UN-Habitat 2007). Consequently, crime and violence 
have received significant attention in the urban literature 
reflecting its visible presence in cities worldwide, particu-
larly in developing countries where rapid urbanization is 
occurring within the context of weak governance systems 
and limited infrastructure and services (including policing) 
(Graham 2010). Indeed, it is now widely acknowledged 
that safety and security are structuring forces for cities as 
they impact on every facet of urban life at the individual, 
household, community and city levels.
An increasing common response to crime across the 
world is the privatization of security and the proliferation 
of private security companies (PSCs).1 This is partly as a 
result of inadequate public policing and, inefficient and 
ineffective judicial system (Lippert and O’Connor 2003). 
The proliferation of PSCs is very interesting as the trend 
1 Corporate entities operating in the security industry can be described 
and defined in variety of ways (Percy 2012). However, in this study, PSCs 
are referred to as private corporate entities established for profit purposes 
to ‘observe, deter, report and record in relation to crime, safety, disorder 
or emergency’ (UNODC 2014, p. 3). These private companies, which the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014) describes as ‘Civilian Pri-
vate Security Services’ provide commercial or fee-paying services aimed at 
protecting persons and physical assets, particularly in residential areas.
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is observed even among industrialized countries where 
recent studies have revealed crime drop since the mid-
1990s, a phenomenon that has bemused many scholars 
(see Farrell et  al. 2010, 2011; Van Dijk et  al. 2012). 
According to the UN-Habitat (2007), almost every city in 
the world has PSCs and estimates in 2000 indicated that 
the annual growth of private security was 30 and 8 % in 
developing and developed countries respectively. The 
UN-Habitat report notes that the balance between public 
and private crime prevention is a major issue requiring 
attention.
In Ghana, a recent report by the Ministry of Interior, 
revealed that there were as many as 176 licensed compa-
nies in ‘good standing’ as of December 2014 (The Daily 
Graphic 2014, pp. 24–25).2 The report suggests that a 
number of PSCs are operating without official licenses/
permits. This clearly puts the number of PSCs operating 
in Ghana beyond what is known by officialdom. The pro-
liferation of PSCs and the operation of unregistered PSCs 
have been subjects of long discussions, and some have 
advocated for the effective management of the sector to 
prevent it from undermining national security in the 
name of business or profit-making (ASDR 2008; GTUC, 
FES 2011; Abudu et al. 2013). More importantly, the pro-
liferation of PSCs is occurring within the context of 
growing levels of reported crime as illustrated in Table 1. 
The Table shows that reported cases of all crime types in 
Ghana has risen significantly over the last three decades, 
particularly for the period, 2000–2010.
PSCs in Ghana provide a range of security services 
which complement that of the state, notably provision of 
security and patrol of private residential and institutional 
buildings (banks, hospitals, schools, markets/shopping 
2 Ghana’s Ministry of Interior is responsible for the registration and regula-
tion of PSCs in the country, and it defines PSCs in ‘good standing’ as com-
panies which have renewed their operating licenses up to date.
outlets, transport terminals, etc.).3 While PSCs have pro-
liferated in recent decades, little studies have been done 
regarding their conformity with the existing policy, insti-
tutional and legal framework and the extent to which 
they are reconfiguring crime prevention in Ghanaian cit-
ies. More importantly, the extent to which PSCs have 
impacted on crime incidence and the public’s perceptions 
on their operations remained unexplored. Based on key 
informant interviews as well as a household survey in key 
Ghanaian cities (Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and 
Tamale), this study seeks to bridge these knowledge gaps 
by examining households’ perceptions of PSCs and crime 
in these cities. In specific terms, the paper has two 
objectives:
1. Analyze the existing policy, institutional and legal 
framework regulating PSCs and its implications for 
crime prevention in urban Ghana and;
2. Examine households’ perception of PSCs and the 
extent to which PSCs are impacting on urban crime.
After the introduction, the article is structured into 
four sections. The first section deals with the global rise 
of PSCs and the Ghanaian case while section two looks 
at the study’s methodology. Section three is on the find-
ings focusing on the paper’s objectives and the last sec-
tion ends with the study’s conclusions.
Global Rise of PSCs and the Ghanaian Case
Recent studies indicate that in both developed and devel-
oping countries, PSCs have not only increased in numbers 
but also there has been significant expansion in the ser-
vices and roles they play, number of staff/personnel 
employed and estimated worth of the industry (see 
Table  2).4 Besides, studies have shown that the size of 
individual PSCs has increased drastically as demand for 
their services soars across the world, allowing PSCs to go 
global and operate across borders. For instance, UNODC 
(2014, p. 2) notes that ‘the largest private security com-
pany employs over 620,000 staff in over 120 countries and 
had a turnover of around $12 billion in 2011. Worldwide, 
the civilian private security industry was estimated to be 
worth $165 billion in 2009, and is likely to be worth $244 
billion by 2016, with annual growth in the region of 7 %’.
3 It needs to be stressed that PSCs in Ghana are overwhelmingly urban-
based, with about 76  % of the officially registered PSCs located in the 
national capital, Accra. This is partly due to the fact that large cities such as 
Accra account for a disproportionate share of all reported cases of crime.
4 UNODC (2014) notes that in a number of countries (notably Britain and 
Northern Ireland, USA and Israel) the budgets of PSCs and the number of 
personnel employed exceed those of the public police. In some cases, the 
staggering numbers of PSCs’ employed have altered significantly the private 
security to police ratio such as in India where the ratio is estimated to be as 
high as almost 5 to 1.
Table 1 Decadal aggregate crime growth and  variation 
in Ghana, 1980–2010
Source: Ghana Police Service, Crime Statistics Bureau, Accra (Owusu et al. 2015, 
p. 258)
Crime type Decade aggregate Inter-cohort varia-
tions (percentage)
1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2010 1980–1999 1990–
2010
Murder 3527 3473 5313 −2 35
Assault 446,625 645,903 972,722 31 34
Armed  
robbery
1848 1345 12,069 −37 89
Theft 416,145 517,420 801,483 20 35
Narcotics 228 465 5481 51 92
Total 868,373 1,168,606 1,797,068 26 93
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According to UNODC (2014), although reasons for the 
growth of PSCs vary, they are centred on fear of crime 
and the public police’s inability to provide the security 
services that people, businesses and other organizations’ 
need. This situation is more so in developing countries 
where rapid urbanization and associated urban sprawl 
have brought to the fore the challenges of security and 
safety of communities. Consequently, increasing crime 
and fear of crime plus weak capacity of the public police 
provide the justification for households and communi-
ties to seek the services of PSCs. Baker (2009) adds that 
in many developing countries, state security and justice 
systems (whether reformed or not) are not going to offer 
an effective and accessible service for the majority of the 
population in this generation or the next due to resource 
constraints, corrupt and abusive practices and political 
interferences.
However, the rise of PSCs is made possible by the neo-
liberal economic and privatization policies of the state 
under the policy doctrine of shifting the burden of public 
goods provision (including security) to society (Lippert 
and O’Connor 2003; Chandler 2013). In other words, as 
GTUC, FES (2011) note the growing numbers of PSCs 
reflect the state’s efforts at outsourcing of state’s func-
tions to the private sector. Lippert and O’Connor (2003) 
have argued that within the context of liberalization and 
privatization, the public sector itself is increasingly a con-
sumer (rather than a producer) of security services, and 
hence justifying the proliferation of PSCs as well as the 
range of services they offer.
Many scholars of governance, politics and development 
have noted the role of actors other than the state in pro-
viding ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and 
Czempiel 1992; Holmqvist 2005). This has challenged 
the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, 
including the sanctioning, control and use of force. An 
important part of this shift in terms of security govern-
ance is the inclusion of private security providers with 
clear corporate structures (Andrew et al. 2008; Chester-
man and Fisher 2009; Graham 2010; Leander 2010; Abra-
hamsen and Williams 2011; Krahmann 2012). Indeed, as 
Shearing and Stenning (1981) and Lippert and O’Connor 
(2003) argue the growth of private security is a ‘quiet 
revolution’ which has coincided with the expansion and 
spread of mass private property such as shopping malls, 
office, recreational, industrial, and manufacturing com-
plexes in urban settings, and increasing share of public 
life takes place on such privately-owned properties.
Related to the above, the concept of network analysis 
offers one way by which we can understand the existing 
multiple security and justice providers, and the complex 
relationships that they have with one another (Wasser-
man and Faust 1994; Johnston and Shearing 2003; 
Dupont 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007). This under-
standing sees a multiplicity of authorizers and providers 
of security and justice ‘that co-exist in multiple ways to 
produce diverse security outcomes’ (Wood and Shearing 
2007, p. 13), and hence, the proliferation of PSCs. Related 
to the network analysis is the growth of the concept of 
third party policing defined as police efforts to persuade 
or coerce organizations, businesses, communities and 
individuals to take some responsibilities for preventing 
and reducing crime (see Buergera 1998; Buergera and 
Mazerolle 1998; Mazerolle and Ransley 2006; Desmond 
and Valdez 2012). Indeed, the growth of PSCs and third 
party policing in general can be placed within the context 
Table 2 Selected information on PSCs in selected countries/regions
Source: a  UNODC (2014, pp. 1–2)
b  Abrahamsen and Williams (2005a), (b)
c  UN-Habitat (2007, p. 14)
Country/region Information
Britain and N. Ireland,  
USA and Israel
PSCs’ budgets and the number of personnel employed exceed those of the public policea
India Estimated ratio of PSC personnel to state police: 4.98 to 1a
Estimated number of PSC personnel: over 7 milliona
South Africa Number of private security guards increased by 150 % from 1997 to 2006c
Kenya About 2000 PSCs in 2005b
Largest PSC in 2005 had 10,000 personnel and operated in 68 different locations across Kenya
Nigeria Between 1500 and 2000 PSCs in 2005, employing over 100,000 peopleb
Brazil Security market has reached US$49 billion, about 10 % of GDP, of which 60 % were private expendituresc
PSCs employed 1.5 million people in 2006c
Latin America 1.6 registered private security guardsa
Estimated 2 million unlicensed private security guardsa
Global/worldwide Civilian private security industry estimated at US$165 billion in 2009, and US$244 billion in 2016a
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of the widespread implementation of new approaches 
that assign policing responsibilities to non-police actors 
(Desmond and Valdez 2012).5
Lastly, the public choice theory attempts to provide 
answers to the question of why individuals, house-
holds and other entities prefer the services of PSCs, 
and hence, the proliferation of these companies (Csé-
falvay 2011). Within the thinking of public choice the-
ory, good government policies, such as public policing, 
are pure public goods for the citizenry. However, there 
may be other actors/agents (usually in the minority) 
that have strong incentives for advocating and lobby-
ing government to implement specific policies such as 
the privatization of security that would benefit these 
few at the expense of the majority. Writing on security 
and gated communities in Budapest, Hungary, Cséfal-
vay (2011) concludes that the zeal for prestige and good 
social status seems to exceed the fear of crime and the 
need for self-segregation as the main idea for moving 
into gated communities and the preference of private 
security.
In broad terms, many of the above explanations of the 
growth of PSCs are applicable in the Ghanaian case. As 
already noted, officially there were as many as 176 regis-
tered PSCs in Ghana in 2014, with several operating 
without license or permit.6 However, a recent press con-
ference organized by the Association of Private Security 
Organizations, Ghana (APSOG) to rebut claims by the 
Ministry of Interior that it has no proper records of 
PSCs put the total number of PSCs registered at 1053 of 
which only 175 are in good standing and of these 70 are 
members of APSOG.7 According to UN-OHCHR (2013, 
p. 3–4), though there may be some disagreements on 
the current statistics, it is not in doubt, however, that 
the number of PSCs in Ghana has increased over the 
years. Indeed, many analysts of the Ghanaian security 
sector have noted the growth of PSCs as the logical 
extension of the economic liberalization and 
5 It must be noted that the growth of third party policing and PSCs in 
particular is not occurring in a vacuum but reflects partly ‘the move from 
centralized control to a system of de-centred networks of governance and 
crime control agents’ (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006, p. 2) within the general 
context of changing government and governance.
6 A report cited in a publication by the Ghana Trades Union Congress 
(GTUC) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) notes that there were as 
many as 438 registered private security organizations in Ghana in 2006 
(GTUC/FES 2011, p. 15).
7 Interior Ministry has data on private security companies. http://news.
peacefmoline.com/pages/news/201505/241811.php. Accessed on May 30, 
2015. Also, several attempts by the authors of this article to seek data on the 
number of registered PSCs per year over the last 10 years through formal 
requests to the Ministry of Interior yielded no results. Instead the authors 
were provided with a list of 1,033 PSCs with no information as to when they 
were established and whether they are still operating or functional.
privatization efforts of the state which began in the mid-
1980s under the World Bank/IMF-supported Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) initiative (GTUC, FES 
2011).
Although the process of Ghana’s association with 
globalization dates back into time, this process has 
been fast-tracked since the mid-1980s when the coun-
try adopted neoliberal economic policies under SAPs 
(Grant and Nijman 2002; Otiso and Owusu 2008; 
Grant 2009). These policies have created the space and 
structures for the influx of global capital into key sec-
tors of the Ghanaian economy including security. 
Indeed, the list of registered PSCs in Ghana includes 
Group 4 Securicor (G4S), a leading global multina-
tional PSC operating in 26 African countries and 110 
countries globally. The presence of these PSCs have 
been partly driven by the influx of global capital into 
sectors such as real/housing estates (especially gated-
communities), mining, marine/aviation, shopping 
malls, and hotels.8
The implementation of neoliberal economic poli-
cies has coincided with an era of rapid urbanization 
and urban sprawl, especially in large Ghanaian cities 
such as Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale. 
According to Cohen (2004), contemporary urbaniza-
tion trends in many developing countries are strongly 
characterized by an unprecedented scale of urban 
change, which is more strongly influenced by globali-
zation than ever before. Furthermore, globalization 
has the tendency to favour the concentration of capi-
tal and economic activities in large cities such as Accra 
and Kumasi (Owusu 2008; Owusu and Oteng-Ababio 
2015). This inevitably exacerbates inequalities across 
cities as large cities tend to attract more investments 
and population which strengthen their growth and 
expansions, and hence, the opportunities for private 
security. Consequently, the police and other security 
agencies of the state are unable to reach all sections 
of cities—providing a perfect opportunity for PSCs 
to step in to provide security, especially for the grow-
ing middle and upper-classes of the population. As 
Wegener (2011, p. 6) notes the growing middle-class in 
Ghana is beginning to ‘see it as a necessity and normal-
ity to have electric fencing around their properties and 
the demand for private security companies in Ghana is 
skyrocketing’.
8 It needs to be stressed that overwhelming majority of PSCs in Ghana are 
owed and run by Ghanaians, mainly former senior police and military offic-
ers, and usually with good connections to the upper echelons of power. This 
obviously raises a lot of questions particularly regarding the process of reg-
istering companies and operations of unregistered PSCs, a subject matter 
which is explored in subsequent sections of this article.
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Methods
This study is based on a mixed methodological 
approach involving the use of qualitative data, mainly 
key informant interviews (KIIs) and a household sur-
vey as part of a broader study that seeks to explore the 
nexus between crime and poverty in urban Ghana. 
Both the interviews and survey covered issues relat-
ing to city and neighborhood crime types, incidence, 
and the causes and effects of crime. More importantly, 
they also include questions on PSCs in crime preven-
tion and services rendered by PSCs. In addition, the 
KIIs explored the relationship between PSCs and the 
police, and the effectiveness of the PSCs in crime 
prevention.
This study was undertaken in four key cities in Ghana, 
namely, Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale. 
These four cities represent the key metropolitan centres 
in Ghana, and account for about 40 % of the total urban 
population of the country (Owusu et al. 2015). In each 
city, the study focuses on three socio-economic neigh-
borhoods with distinct characteristics (low-class, mid-
dle-class and upper-class residential communities). In 
all, the study covered 13 selected communities as shown 
in Table  3.9 Primary data collection was done in two 
9 The communities were selected based on the researchers’ knowledge 
of these communities as well as classification of urban neighborhood into 
three distinct characteristics of low, middle and upper-class neighborhoods 
by earlier studies (see Benneh et al. 1993; Songsore et al. 1998, 2005; Agyei-
Mensah and Owusu 2010; Owusu and Agyei-Mensah 2011). This selection 
process was validated by key stakeholders such as the city planners, police 
and local government representatives (popularly referred to as Assembly 
Members) during initial project reconnaissance visits to the selected cities.
phases. Phase one involved conducting KIIs among sen-
ior police/crime officers of the Ghana Police Service; 
city planners/administrators, NGOs and traditional/
religious/opinion leaders. In all, 50 KIIs were conducted 
in all the four cities. Insights obtained from the qualita-
tive study were used to develop a household question-
naire survey for phase two. In all, 2745 households were 
sampled in all the selected communities in the four cit-
ies. 10
Results
In the following, the key findings of the study are dis-
cussed in respect of the article’s objectives as set out in 
the background section:
Policy, institutional and legal framework of private security 
in Ghana
The existing policy, institutional and legal framework 
of Ghana provides the list of key actors in the country’s 
10 Assisted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), the official agency in-
charge of census and other public surveys in Ghana, the sample design was 
a clustered, multi-stage probability sample based on a list of enumeration 
areas (EAs) that was used for Ghana’s 2010 Population and Housing Cen-
sus by the GSS. The random selection of households for the survey was 
achieved by two stage processes: first, EAs were selected through the prob-
ability proportional to size (PPS method) based on each city’s share of the 
total population of the four cities involved in the study. Afterwards, each 
city’s share of EAs were subsequently proportionally distributed among the 
selected neighborhoods based on each neighborhood’s population. At the 
second stage, 15 households and their respective household heads or knowl-
edgeable adult representatives of the households were selected systemati-
cally in each EA, with a random start and interval separately for each EA 
to produce a total of 2745 households for the four cities (Accra, Kumasi, 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale).
Table 3 Selected communities: survey sample allocation and number of KIIs









Kumasi Ahodwo Upper‑class 60 14
Oforikrom Middle‑class 465
Aboabo Low‑class 360
Sekondi‑Takoradi Chapel Hill Upper‑class 165 11
Anaji Estate Middle‑class 135
New Takoradi Low‑class 210
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security regulations and oversight, namely, the Ghana 
Police Service (GPS), Armed Forces, Immigration Service 
and Customs Excise and Preventive Unit of the Ghana 
Revenue Authority (GRA). Others include the state intel-
ligence agency, the Bureau for National Investigation 
(BNI) and related agencies; judicial and penal services, 
that is, the Ghana Prisons Service and Judiciary Ser-
vice; cabinet//Parliament; private sector and; civil soci-
ety (including traditional authority and NGOs). Clearly, 
as Abudu et al. (2013, p. 12) note ‘the security landscape 
in Ghana is diverse and not homogenous, with various 
actors operating outside the state mechanism to provide 
security to various segments of the population’.
The registration, regulation and monitoring of PSCs are 
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ghana Police Service. In fact, a review of existing legal 
regulations of PSCs shows that the attempts by the state 
to promote and regulate the private security sector dates 
back to the early 1970s with the promulgation of 
Section  38 of the Police Service Act of 1970 (Act 350). 
This represents the state’s initial attempt to define the 
parameters for regulating non-statutory security actors 
like PSCs. 11 Nothing by way of legislation or policy was 
introduced by the state to promote PSCs after 1970 until 
the early 1990s, when Act 350 was amended with Legisla-
tive Instruments 1571 of 1992 and 1579 of 1994. These 
Legislative Instruments (LIs) provide the process for the 
registration, vetting and granting of license to security 
organizations; approval of uniform/cloth and other 
accoutrements to be used by private security organiza-
tions (which must not bear resemblance to those used by 
the state’s security agencies); restrictions on the use of 
fire arms and; renewal of license/certificate of operation. 
These legal instruments govern the activities of registered 
commercial private security organizations as well as 
informal organization such as neighbourhood watchdog 
committees.
According to ASDR (2008) ‘as of now, the private secu-
rity sector is controlled by the Police Service Act of LI 
1571 which lacks a lot of detail so far as management of 
the sector is concerned, resulting in the need to find a 
more comprehensive and adequate legislative instrument 
to consolidate the security of the state’. It adds that a key 
missing link in the existing legal and policy regime is the 
absence of a dedicated regulatory authority located either 
within the Ministry of Interior or the Ghana Police Ser-
vice. As a key informant in the sector noted:
11 Indeed, Section 38 of Act 350 came about as a result of the then govern-
ment, Progress Party’s (PP) pro-capitalist and privatization-orientations. 
However, the PP government had a short stay in power as it was over-
thrown in a military coup in 1972, and this ended its privatization and pro-
capitalist agenda.
At the moment, the Ministry of Interior is supposed 
to regulate activities of private security companies 
but the Ministry is not doing this. We need a dedi-
cated unit within the Ministry to do this…. For a 
long time, even having a Desk Officer at the Minis-
try has been a problem. At a point, we had a Desk 
Officer who was only in charge of refugees’ issues and 
also acted as an Officer for the private security, who 
very often was not available. He was always out. 
Now, there is someone who is at the Minister’s office, 
whom we are told is the Desk Officer for Private 
Security but what is his or her role? …. And so, more 
or less he takes complains or reports to the Minis-
ter and also passes on any communication that the 
Ministry would like to pass on to us [PSCs]. So that 
is his role but as to the real oversight responsibility, 
I don’t think anybody [unit] is taking it up for now.
The above quote and evidence from the literature on 
PSCs in Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that it is common for 
private companies to be formally registered but rarely are 
they regularly monitored (see Baker 2009; Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2007, 2011; UNODC 2014; UN-OHCHR 
2013). In the Ghanaian case, this situation partly accounts 
for the proliferation of PSCs as well as the presence of 
unregistered companies (UN-OHCHR 2013; ASDR 
2008). On the other hand, ASDR (2008) partly blamed 
the non-registration of PSCs in Ghana on long delays in 
the granting of licenses/permits and the lack of transpar-
ency in the registration process. For instance, 
Section 12(1) of LI 1571 states clearly that no employee 
of an organization licensed under the LI shall wear, carry 
or bear any uniform, cap, badge, accoutrements or other 
identification mark unless these have been approved for 
use by the Inspector-General of Police in writing. How-
ever, in recent times the Ghana Police Service have had to 
issue several directives in the media to stop this practice 
as several PSCs and other organizations have flouted this 
regulation.12
The inability of the Ministry of Interior and the Police 
Service to adequately regulate PSCs partly accounts for 
the formation of APSOG in 1998. APSOG is a voluntary 
association of PSCs which seeks to promote the inter-
est of the industry and to ensure its regulation to enable 
it work effectively with all stakeholders. It also seeks to 
promote standardization of training within the pri-
vate security industry and also to serve as the industry’s 
mouthpiece. However, APSOG is a voluntary association 
and membership is not compulsory. In addition, it has 
12 Stop wearing unapproved uniforms—Police http://www.graphic.com.gh/
news/general-news/22576-stop-wearingunapproved-uniforms-police.html; 
http://www.ghanamma.com/stop-wearing-unapproved-uniforms-police. 
Accessed on May 20, 2015.
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no hand in the licensing and renewing of the permits of 
PSCs. As a result, few PSCs have joined the association 
which started with 25 PSCs, but with current member-
ship of about 100, although APSOG acknowledged that 
there are over 1000 PSCs in Ghana.
With the above assessment of the policy, institutional 
and legal framework of PSCs, what are households’ per-
ception about the role of PSCs in preventing and reduc-
ing crime in urban Ghana? Based on mainly analysis of 
the results of household questionnaire survey and key 
informant interviews in the selected cities and communi-
ties, the next section attempts to provide answers to this 
question.
Households’ perceptions of PSCs in Ghana
Our analysis of the household survey results indicate that 
12.6 % of the 2745 households surveyed in the four cit-
ies of Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale had 
knowledge on whether PSC operates in their communi-
ties. This is, however, relatively higher in the high-class 
neighborhoods (57  %) compared to just 2.7  % and then 
12.7  % in low-class and middle-class neighbourhoods 
respectively. This buttressed the view of Abudu et  al. 
(2013) and Heyns and Steifiszyn (2006) that PSCs tend to 
be urban-focused and profit-motivated, and they target 
only the wealthier in society that are able to afford their 
services.
Tables  4 and 5 provide information on the reasons 
assigned by households as accounting for the prolifera-
tion of PSCs by city and neighbourhood socio-economic 
(SE) status. The results from the two tables are fairly 
similar. It is, however, interesting to note that job crea-
tion drive/business motive is seen among all the differ-
ent socio-economic households and cities as the single 
key driver for PSCs’ proliferation. Thus, for over 2 in 10 
households and almost 3 in 10 in the case of Takoradi, 
job creation drive/business motive is regarded as the 
reason for the proliferation of PSCs rather than the com-
plimentary efforts of these companies to enhance com-
munal security and the absence or loss of confidence in 
public security. This result is very interesting given the 
fact that the literature has highlighted the complimentary 
role of PSCs in providing security due to the absence/
loss of confidence in public security and an ever-growing 
urban population with unmet security needs as the criti-
cal reasons accounting for the proliferation of PSCs (see 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2005a, b; UN-Habitat 2007; 
UNODC 2014).
Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that when all 
the explicitly stated security drivers are put together 
as shown in Tables  4 and 5, unmet security needs of 
households account for the main reason for the prolif-
eration of PSCs across the four cities and three different 
socio-economic neighbourhoods. In other words, when 
reasons such as complimentary efforts to enhance com-
munal security; absence of public security set-up; loss of 
confidence in public security and; over-population with 
unmet security needs—are put together the security rea-
son becomes the dominant reason for the proliferation 
of PSCs in line with the mainstream literature. Indeed, 
when the security reasons are put together about 6 in 10 
households viewed the proliferation of PSCs as largely 
due to unmet public security needs. Nevertheless, the 
reference to jobs/business opportunities offered by PSCs 
according to the household survey remained significant 
as there is relatively little reference to it in the private 
security and crime literature.
Although PSCs are seen as a major source of employ-
ment for young and unskilled workers, a recent compre-
hensive report on the wages and working conditions of 
workers of PSCs in four regions of Ghana (Greater Accra, 
Western, Ashanti and Northern Regions) concludes that 
Table 4 Reasons for springing up of PSCs by city
Source: Household questionnaire survey, 2014
Reason Selected cities
Accra Kumasi Takoradi Tamale Total
Job creation drive/business motive 18.7 14.3 28.4 22.0 21.6
Complimentary efforts to enhance communal security 18.7 26.2 15.0 4.9 18.1
Absence of public security set‑up 16.5 17.3 18.1 4.9 16.7
Loss of confidence in public security 21.1 11.9 8.4 26.8 14.8
Over‑population with an unmet security needs 10.9 13.1 12.5 29.3 12.8
Community self‑help initiative 9.7 10.1 1.3 0.0 6.1
Came alongside a multinational company 1.9 5.4 11.6 0.0 6.1
Affordability/tailor‑made services 2.5 1.1 2.8 12.2 2.8
Other 0.0 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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these workers are poorly remunerated (GTUC, FES 
2011).13 The report adds that ‘while the preponderance of 
low pay in the private security industry is not isolated, it 
also reflects to a very large extent, the low level of educa-
tion of workers in the industry. Majority of the workers 
have only had junior and senior level of education’ 
(GTUC, FES 2011, p. 24). The low wages and poor work-
ing conditions of employees as noted in the report is of 
great concern since it can impact negatively on crime 
prevention.14
Our analysis of the household survey results indicate 
that across the four cities and the different socio-eco-
nomic neighbourhoods, households have a fairly good 
knowledge of the different types of security services pro-
vided by PSCs. For instance, though very few households 
in low-class neighbourhoods have any knowledge of 
PSCs operating in their neighbourhoods, however, these 
households were able to identify the keys services pro-
vided by PSCs: guard public servants/firms/property; 
guard private servants/firms/property; provide surveil-
lance system and; collaborate with state security for com-
munity protection. These results obtained from the 
low-class communities were fairly similar to those of the 
13 The GTUC/FES (2011) study found the average gross monthly income of 
PSC personnel to be approximately GH¢150.00 (about US$94 at the end of 
2011 exchange rate of about GH¢1.6 to US$1). This monthly gross income 
of PSCs largely remain unchanged in dollar terms at current exchange rate 
of about GH¢4 to US$1.
14 Reports already exist in the Ghanaian media of either the direct or indi-
rect involvement of employees of PSCs in criminal activities, including 
armed robbery and burglary. As a former Interior Minister noted in a report 
‘what remains a source of concern to our Ministry are reports to the police 
of illegal activities involving employees of PSCs’ (ASDR 2007, p. 8).
middle and upper-class communities which employ the 
services of PSCs.15 The good knowledge of households 
about the services offered by PSCs may reflect the pro-
found presence of PSCs in key Ghanaian cities as their 
numbers and services have increased over the years.
Table  6 provides the results of what households con-
sider as the benefits of PSCs. Interestingly and similar to 
the reasons assigned by households for the proliferation 
of PSC, the provision of employment or jobs top the list 
of benefits.16 Table 6 shows that even for high-class resi-
dential neighbourhoods which demand the services of 
PSCs most, households placed the creation of jobs as a 
benefit of PSCs above improved household and commu-
nity security. Indeed, similar observations can be made 
when the data is aggregated by city. Across the study cit-
ies and the different socio-economic neighbourhoods 
within these cities, interviews suggest close correlation 
between lack of employment and crime. As a Planning 
Officer in Sekondi-Takoradi noted:
You know usually majority of these people who 
engage in crime are the youth who don’t have work 
to do…. So when people are employed, then the ten-
dency for them to engage in crime is very minimal…. 
It is said that the devil finds work for the idle hand. 
Most of the people who engage in crime are people 
who usually don’t have jobs.
The above quotation and the general sentiments 
expressed regarding the importance of unemployment as 
a predisposition factor to criminal activities possibly 
account for the results in Table  6. Even though studies 
have indicated that staff of PSCs are poorly paid, PSCs 
remained a vital source of employment for lowly-edu-
cated and unskilled young people (GTUC, FES 2011). 
Although the actual number of staff employed by PSCs in 
Ghana is difficult to ascertain, it can be estimated that 
with a conservative figure of 450 PSCs in the country, the 
number of people employed by these companies run into 
thousands. For instance, UT Private Security Services 
Limited (UTPSSL), a Ghanaian-owned company oper-
ated with a total staff strength of over 400 in January 
2013. Certainly, UTPSSL is not the largest PSC in Ghana, 
but its staff strength gives an indication of the total 
15 Although low-class households rarely employed the services of PSCs, 
the relatively good knowledge of the services provided by these companies 
among these households may be probably due to the high presence of PSCs 
employees in these communities. As earlier noted, PSCs’ employees tend to 
be lowly-educated and poorly paid – employees who fit the description of 
the majority of individuals and households residing in low-class communi-
ties.
16 As earlier noted for the reasons accounting for the proliferation of PSCs, 
if the security-related benefits are put together, improved security is the 
main benefit of PSCs to households.
Table 5 Reasons for  proliferation of  PSCs by  neighbour-
hood socio-economic status
Source: Household questionnaire survey, 2014
Reason Community SE status
Low Middle High Total
Job creation drive/business motive 19.4 19.8 22.6 20.9
Complimentary efforts to enhance  
communal security
14.6 16.6 20.8 18.1
Absence of public security set‑up 9.7 21.1 15.5 17.3
Loss of confidence in public security 18.4 18.7 8.9 14.6
Over‑population with an unmet security 
needs
19.5 11.3 13.2 13.0
Community self‑help initiative 8.7 4.8 7.1 6.3
Came alongside a multinational  
company
2.9 4.8 8.9 6.3
Affordability/tailor‑made services 5.8 2.4 1.8 2.6
Other 1.0 0.5 1.2 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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number of people employed in the private security indus-
try in the country.17
Table  7 provides information regarding households’ 
opinions on the challenges of PSCs to households and 
communities by socio-economic status. According to 
Table 7, the key challenge to households and communi-
ties is that PSCs tend to increase household expenditure. 
This view is strongest among high-class communities 
where 35.3  % of households hold this view. Similarly, 
the services of PSCs are regarded by households as 
17 Assuming conservatively on the average each of the 450 PSCs employed 
between 50 and 100 staff, guesstimates will put the total number of employ-
ees of PSCs between 22,500 and 45,000. These guesstimated figures come 
closer or exceed the staff strength of the state’s police which stood at 29,117 
in 2012 (NDPC 2013). According to NDPC (2013), Ghana’s Police-Pop-
ulation Ratio (PPR) of 1:847 in 2012 remains far from the United Nations’ 
policing standard of 1:500 PPR.
contributing to increase expenditure of firms/industries. 
Interestingly, about 1 in 10 households viewed the ser-
vices of PSCs as weakening or compromising the security 
of household and community. This view was relatively 
stronger in the low and middle-class neighbourhoods 
compared to the upper-class neighbourhoods. Other 
challenges identified to a limited degree are duplicating 
police effort; allowing criminals to infiltrate neighbour-
hoods and; increasing crime occurrence.
Table  7 suggests that a substantial proportion of 
households, particularly in low and middle-class neigh-
bourhoods, viewed PSCs as not enhancing security and 
reducing crime but rather compromising household 
and neighbourhood crime fighting efforts. In all, Table 7 
suggests that nearly 50 % of households viewed PSCs as 
compromising household and community security. This 
proportion is, however, relatively higher for low and mid-
dle-class neighbourhoods. Indeed, households’ views of 
PSCs as weakening household and community security; 
allowing criminals to infiltrate neighbourhood; increas-
ing crime occurrence and; duplicating police efforts, do 
not present a good image of PSCs. This suggests that not 
all households see the services of PSCs as complement-
ing the efforts of the state in terms of security and the 
prevention of crime. However, the complementary role 
of PSCs is critical in the face of the public police’s inabil-
ity to meet the security needs of households. As a senior 
Police Officer noted:
I think private security companies are very useful 
and many of them are needed in the system. They 
[private security] are effective as when they are 
around scarcely will crime take place unless they 
compromise their position. This is because criminals 
don’t want somebody to see what they’re doing and 
that is the nature of bad people…. The mere presence 
of private security at a location can deter crime.
Conclusion and policy implications
Similar to the situation across many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and other parts of the developing world, 
the private security industry has seen significant growth 
in recent decades in Ghana. This situation has been aided 
by Ghana’s privatization policies, and an ever-growing 
urban population with unmet security needs. Within 
this context, the country has witnessed the proliferation 
of PSCs as the demand for security services has soared 
due to increased global capital investments and an ever-
growing middle-class. However, the formal regulation 
of Ghana’s private security sector remained weak—in an 
industry described by Percy (2012, p. 941) as ‘agile and 
innovative, and has responded swiftly to changing market 
pressures’. Consequently, many PSCs remained beyond 
Table 6 Benefits of  PSCs to  the household/community 
by SE status
Source: Household questionnaire survey, 2014
Benefits Community SE status
Low Middle High Total
Created jobs 22.1 23.6 22.9 23.1
Improved household security 15.4 24.6 22.3 22.5
Improved community security 18.3 16.3 20.2 18.2
Improved industrial/commercial security 17.3 14.0 19.1 16.6
Improved crime prevention efforts 18.3 11.9 9.0 11.4
Complimented police efforts 7.7 7.0 4.9 6.2
Other 1.0 2.3 1.5 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7 Challenges of  PSCs to  household/community 
by SE status
Source: Household questionnaire survey, 2014
Challenges Community SE status
Low Middle High Total
Increased household expenditure 21.9 23.4 35.3 28.8
Increased industrial/companies’  
expenditure
18.8 15.9 33.3 24.3
Weakened/compromised household 
security
18.8 22.1 7.7 15.0
Weakened/compromised  
neighbourhood security
15.6 11.0 8.3 10.2
Duplicating police effort 12.5 7.6 4.5 6.6
Allowed criminals to infiltrate  
neighbourhood
9.3 6.9 3.2 5.4
Increased crime occurrence 3.1 4.8 1.9 3.3
Other 0.0 8.3 5.8 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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the radar of state regulations with serious implications 
for security and efforts to fighting crime.
PSCs in Ghana remained urban-focused, with many of 
them concentrated in the capital, Accra, targeting mid-
dle and upper-class households where their services 
are mostly patronized. However, contrary to the well-
rehearsed reasons cited in the literature as accounting for 
their proliferation, a survey of households in low, middle 
and upper-class neighbourhoods in key Ghanaian cities 
cite job creation/business motive as the single key reason 
for the proliferation of PSCs. Similarly, they cite job crea-
tion as the key benefit of PSCs to households and com-
munities, ahead of security considerations. Nevertheless, 
the survey results show that when the security-related 
reasons are put together, the need to improve security 
remains the key driver for the proliferation of PSCs and 
the benefits derived by households for the services of 
these companies. Furthermore, households identify the 
services of PSCs as contributing to increased household 
and firm expenditure as well as weakened and compro-
mising household and community security.
Ghana is undergoing a process of urbanization with 
rapid shifting of the country’s population from rural to 
urban areas. However, the process is unplanned result-
ing in uncontrolled sprawl which stretches infrastruc-
ture and services (including police services). With rising 
crime incidence, providing security for all sections of the 
population should be part and parcel of any discussions 
of Ghana’s urban future. Indeed, there is the need to bet-
ter regulate PSCs through amending the existing legal 
regime to properly complement the efforts of the Ghana 
Police Service and other security agencies of the state with 
the overall aim of promoting a safe and an inclusive urban 
development for all (including the poor). It is within this 
context that identifying PSCs and their areas of operations 
properly and a dedicated oversight authority become a 
matter of importance in terms of the regulation of these 
private companies by the state. Clearly, a good knowl-
edge of PSCs by the state provides opportunities not only 
for monitoring their activities but also promoting joint 
actions and collaborations for the purpose of maintaining 
security and securing the urban environment. Indeed, all 
indications suggest that the PSCs have come to stay as the 
underlying factors for their growth and proliferation are 
not likely to go away soon. It is therefore important that 
challenges confronting the private security industry in 
Ghana are addressed to enhance the complementary role 
of the industry in providing security for neighbourhoods.
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